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Non-Technical Summary 
 
In some cases, linking of policies for the provision of international public goods can 
increase welfare on a global scale. One example is the international linking of national 
policies for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. By pooling of abatement 
options, economic efficiency of regulation can be increased since least-cost abatement 
options can be identified more easily. Linking of policies can lead to situations where 
abatement costs decrease in one country, but increase in another country. The 
magnitude of expected changes in abatement costs is an important determinant 
whether a country is interested in direct policy linking or not.  
In this paper, we consider the case of two countries that have to produce an 
exogenously given amount of a public good (e.g. greenhouse gas abatement) under 
uncertain (abatement) costs or otherwise purchase the good on a market (e.g. 
international emissions trading). We compare the case when both countries choose 
regulation by quantities (“quantity-quantity linking”) to a situation where one of the 
countries is choosing prices (e.g. a carbon tax) while the other country chooses 
quantities (“price-quantity linking”). To examine the effective costs of regulation for 
both countries under uncertainty and different policy scenarios, we numerically solve 
the model where uncertainty is modelled by assuming that abatement costs have a log-
normal distribution.      
It is shown that in most cases, total expected costs increase for the country that chooses 
prices under international emissions trading when compared to quantity regulation. 
The only case for which we found that the price-setting country would be better off 
choosing prices occurred when the quantity-setting country had a much more onerous 
target than the price-setting country. Countries will further be unable to identify a tax 
rate that minimizes costs because of uncertainty and unknown correlation of costs 
between countries. Large economies face higher expected cost increases relative to 
smaller economies when choosing regulation by prices under international emissions 
trading. 
If there are specified quantity targets for the provision of an international public good, 
and international policy linkages exist, price regulation will usually lead to both higher 
costs and higher variance of costs when compared to quantity regulation. In this case, 
price regulation will not serve as a mechanism for cost containment.  
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
In einigen Fällen kann die Verknüpfung von Politikmaßnahmen zur Bereitstellung 
internationaler öffentlicher Güter zu einer Steigerung der globalen Wohlfahrt führen. 
Ein Beispiel dafür ist die internationale Verknüpfung nationaler Politiken zur 
Vermeidung von Treibhausgasen. Dadurch werden zusätzliche kostengünstige 
Vermeidungsoptionen eröffnet deren Nutzung die globale Wohlfahrt erhöhen kann. 
Eine Verbindung von Politikmaßnahmen kann dabei zu Situationen führen in denen 
sich die Kosten für ein Land verringern, während die Kosten für ein anderes Land 
ansteigen. Das Ausmaß erwarteter Kostenänderungen bestimmt dabei unter anderem 
ob ein Land Interesse an einer Politikverknüpfung hat.  
In diesem Papier wird der Fall zweier Länder betrachtet die eine exogen gegebene 
Menge eines öffentlichen Gutes (z.B. Treibhausgasminderung) unter unsicheren Kosten 
produzieren oder das Gut andernfalls auf dem Markt erwerben (internationaler 
Emissionshandel). Dabei werden die anfallenden Kosten verglichen falls beide Länder 
Mengenregulierung wählen (z.B. ein Emissionshandelssystem) und falls ein Land eine 
Preislösung implementiert (z.B. eine CO2-Steuer) während das andere Land eine 
Mengenlösung wählt. Um die Kostenentwicklung in beiden Fällen und unter 
Unsicherheit über die tatsächlich anfallenden Kosten zu ermitteln wird eine 
numerische Anwendung des Modells vorgenommen, wobei Unsicherheit durch eine 
log-Normalverteilung abgebildet wird.  
Wie sich zeigt, steigen die erwarteten Kosten des Landes das eine Preislösung wählt (im 
Vergleich zur Mengenregulierung), wenn ein internationaler Emissionshandel besteht. 
Dem Land ist es zudem unmöglich einen optimalen Steuersatz zu ermitteln da 
Unsicherheit bezüglich der tatsächlichen Kosten sowie bezüglich der Korrelation der 
Kosten beider Länder besteht. Größere Länder müssen zudem höhere 
Kostensteigerungen bei Wahl einer Preislösung erwarten als kleinere Länder. 
Falls vorgegebene Mengenziele bei der Bereitstellung eines öffentlichen Gutes bestehen 
und Verbindungen nationaler Politiken bestehen, dann wird die Preislösung im 
Vergleich zur Mengenlösung sowohl zu höheren erwarteten Kosten als auch zu einer 
höheren Varianz der Kosten führen. Die Preislösung ist daher in diesem Fall nicht zur 
Eindämmung oder Begrenzung der Kosten geeignet.   
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1 Introduction
The ‘prices versus quantity’ literature has found that reducing emissions through price control
is preferable to quantity control if marginal costs are steeper compared to marginal benefits
(Weitzman, 1974; Nordhaus, 1994; Newell & Pizer, 2003); that this holds under a wide range
of circumstances (Kolstad, 1996; Hoel & Karp, 2002; Quirion, 2004; Pezzey & Jotzo, 2012);
and that hybrid schemes of prices and quantities can reduce costs associated with uncertainty
about benefits and costs (Roberts & Spence, 1976; Mandell, 2008), address problems of asym-
metric information (Krysiak & Oberauner, 2010), and contribute to cost containment (Pizer,
2002). This literature pivots around the relationship between the marginal cost and marginal
benefit of the provision of a public good under uncertainty.
In reality however, this consideration is unlikely to be of prominence in national policy-
making for the global provision of environmental or other public goods. Where a regulating
jurisdiction faces a defined standard, such as an agreed amount of emissions that must not be
exceeded in a certain area and period of time, it may regard benefits as exogenous, and instead
focus on how best to implement a commitment given national circumstances and preferences.
A commitment to produce a given amount of a public good resource can be fulfilled ei-
ther through a quantity regulation or through a price instrument such as a tax. A tax may
be preferred in some jurisdictions, while other jurisdictions may choose quantity instruments
with flexible prices, such as cap-and-trade. Trading the public good provision between ju-
risdictions may be possible. Questions then arise as to the cost of one jurisdiction’s choice
of a price instrument and the distribution of costs between the two jurisdictions; trade-offs
between expected costs and cost variability; the optimal tax rate; and the effect of parameters
such as the relative size of jurisdictions and the correlation of uncertainties in costs.
We investigate these issues using a two-period, two-country model, which to our knowl-
edge is the first such contribution in the literature. Countries face exogenous environmen-
tal standards (agreed in international negotiations), uncertainty about abatement costs, and
choose policies (based on prices or quantities) before uncertainty is revealed. In the subse-
quent period, uncertainty is resolved and countries produce the public good according to
the chosen policy. Results are derived numerically using a partial-equilibrium model that
assumes log-normally distributed abatement costs. Environmental effectiveness is given by
the assumption of full compliance with the exogenous environmental standard or abatement
target. It is also assumed that countries have no incentive to abate more than the required
target.
The archetypal application for this question is global greenhouse gas control. Some coun-
tries may choose a price instrument such as a carbon tax to reduce emissions, either because
of a preference to make the marginal cost of production predictable where production costs
are unknown ex ante, or for reasons of political economy. The resurgent discussion of a car-
bon tax for the United States (McKibbin et al. , 2012) is a point in case. Other countries rely
on quantity instruments and leave their emissions price flexible, as in the emissions trading
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schemes in operation in Europe and Australia, and planned for China (Petherick, 2012; Lo,
2012) and South Korea (Tuerk et al. , 2013). Meanwhile, major countries have made quan-
titative commitments to limit their emissions to some given level at 2020 (Bodansky, 2011).
The costs of reducing emissions are uncertain ex ante, and so will be the effect of a given
tax. Consequently it would be logical for countries with price-based instruments to balance
their actual emissions against their commitments by either buying emissions allowances from
countries with quantity instruments or selling allowances to them. A fixed tax will differ from
the ex-post optimum level, and from the emissions price in the ’quantity’ country.
To summarise the model, the price-setting country assigns a fixed price but simultane-
ously aims to achieve a predetermined quantity under uncertain costs, so the likely outcome
is a divergence of marginal costs and trading of allowances between the two countries. The
price for allowances is equal to the marginal costs for the quantity-setting country; and indi-
rectly determined by the tax rate in the price-setting country, which will affect the number of
allowances traded.
While throughout this paper we consider two countries being confronted with an envi-
ronmental standard with tradable property rights, our framework may also apply to other
entities, such as states, cities, or firms, and to many situations of public good provision when
there is no single social planner.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the framework for modelling price-
quantity and quantity-quantity linking under fixed abatement targets. Section 3 contains the
results from applying and numerically solving the model. These results include investigations
of expected costs for different-sized countries; the ex-ante optimal choice of tax rate; and the
variance in costs. Section 4 discusses the results, discusses how the results relate to some of
the broader literature on prices vs. quantities, and concludes.
2 The Model
The model has two producing entities (countries), each of which has been allocated the pro-
duction of a quantity of a public good (pollution reduction or abatement). Each country can
produce the reductions itself, or can otherwise pay the other country to reduce its emissions by
a greater amount (through international emissions trading). Countries face uncertainty about
abatement costs. If a price-based instrument is chosen, the tax rate is set before uncertainty is
resolved.
We assume that Country 1 sets a price (tax) and produces abatement up to a marginal
cost equal to the tax rate, while Country 2 sets a quantity for its domestic abatement and lets
its price be flexible. In order to meet its quantity target, Country 1 can purchase abatement
from Country 2; or if it directly produced more abatement than its allocation, it can sell the
excess to Country 2 (’price-quantity linking’). To assess the consequences from one country
choosing prices, ’price-quantity linking’ will be compared to the case when both countries
choose quantities (’quantity-quantity linking’).
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2.1 Linking of Prices and Quantities
Country i = 1, 2 produces abatement qi at costs ci, which are ex-ante uncertain, so that
ci = ci(qi, θi)
where θi is a random variable that influences the cost for country i. Cost functions are
continuously differentiable and each country has increasing marginal abatement costs so that,
when qi > 0,
∂2ci
∂q2i
> 0.
Each country faces an exogenous quantity target Qi1. Country 1 sets a tax rate t, and
produces a quantity q1(t, θ1) of the good that satisfies c′1(q1, θ1) = t, where c
′
1 = ∂c1/∂q1 is
Country 1’s marginal cost function. The overall quantity goal is met by Country 2 producing
whatever is required to meet the overall quantity goal Q1 +Q2.
If Country 1 produces less than Q1 allowances, it purchases the difference in allowances
Q1 − q1 from Country 2; if Country 1 produces more than Q1 allowances, then is sells the dif-
ference to Country 2. However, Country 2 will be willing to buy no more than Q2 allowances
in total, so the amount of allowances sold from Country 1 to Country 2 will be given by
a = Q2 − q2 = min{q1 −Q1,Q2}. (1)
The exogenous quantity target Q2 is also a quantity restriction on the amount of allowances
that Country 1 can sell to Country 2. The situation where Q2 < q1 − Q1 will lead to a corner
solution where there is more abatement than actually needed (q1 + q2 > Q1 +Q2) and the price
of allowances becomes equal to zero. This could occur in practice, for example, if Country 2 is
substantially smaller than Country 1, so that Q2 is substantially smaller than Q1. The situation
where Country 2 is smaller or larger than Country 1 is examined in Section 3.2.
In order to meet its quantity requirement, Country 2 directly produces q2 = Q2 +Q1 − q1
of the good, except for when Q2 < q1 − Q1, in which case Country 2 will produce none of
the good. It is assumed that it is not possible to produce a negative quantity of the good and
that both countries fully comply with their abatement targets. If Country 2 sells allowances
to Country 1, then the price will be equal to the marginal cost of producing another unit of
the good in country 2, i.e. p = c′2(Q2 + Q1 − q1, θ2) when Q2 > q1 − Q1, and zero otherwise.
We assume that Country 1 is not able to exercise market power when trading allowances, so
when Q2 < q1 −Q1, allowances will be free.
1The model treats the quantity targets as exogenous, and does not model potential benefits from additional
abatement. However, it is possible that countries who benefit from additional abatement could choose a high price
(or tax) in order to achieve benefits from additional abatement. For the case of greenhouse gas abatement, benefits
from additional abatement are limited by the public good character of abatement and strategic considerations
(Beccherle & Tirole, 2011). While the costs for greenhouse gas abatement occur as private costs to a country,
benefits occur on a global level where other countries can not be excluded from benefiting.
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The total cost for Country 1 is the sum of the cost to directly reduce pollution, and the cost
of paying Country 2 to produce the additional abatement required. It is given by
C1 = c1(q1, θ1)− ac′2(Q2 − a, θ2). (2)
Similarly, the total cost for Country 2 is given by
C2 = c2(Q2 − a, θ2) + ac′2(Q2 − a, θ2). (3)
When Q2 ≥ q1 −Q1 (the interior solution), costs are given by
C[Q2≥q1−Q1]1 = c1(q1(t, θ1), θ1)−
(
q1(t, θ1)−Q1
)
c′2(Q2 +Q1 − q1(t, θ1), θ2),
C[Q2≥q1−Q1]2 = c2(Q2 +Q1 − q1(t, θ1), θ2)
+
(
q1(t, θ1)−Q1
)
c′2(Q2 +Q1 − q1(t, θ1), θ2).
(4)
When Q2 ≤ q1 −Q1 (the corner solution), costs are given by
C[Q2≤q1−Q1]1 = c1(q1(t, θ1), θ1),C
[Q2≤q1−Q1]
2 = 0. (5)
When Q2 = q1 −Q1, C[Q2≥q1−Q1]1 = C[Q2≤q1−Q1]1 , so either set of equations can be used.
2.2 Quantity-Quantity Linking
Assuming no market failure or other distortions, if both countries choose quantity regulation
and trade allowances, marginal abatement costs will be equal. The situation with ’quantity-
quantity linking’ is used as the reference case that will be used to compare costs associated
with price-quantity linking.
Suppose that Country 1 sells a˜ allowances to Country 2 (with a˜ being negative when
Country 1 purchases allowances from Country 2) so that the countries have equal marginal
costs. If −Q1 < a˜ and a˜ < Q2, the price that the allowances trade at, p˜, will satisfy
p˜ = c′1(Q1 + a˜, θ1) = c
′
2(Q2 − a˜, θ2). (6)
The situation where a˜ = −Q1 corresponds to all abatement occurring in Country 2; and
a˜ = Q2 corresponds to all abatement occurring in Country 1. Costs for each country under
quantity-quantity linking are given by
C˜1(θ1, θ2) = c1(Q1 + a˜, θ1)− p˜a˜, (7)
C˜2(θ1, θ2) = c2(Q2 − a˜, θ2) + p˜a˜. (8)
2.3 Uncertain abatement costs
To examine interactions of price and quantity approaches more closely, further parameterisa-
tion is required. It is assumed that abatement costs are ex-ante uncertain and log-normally
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distributed. This is a suitable assumption when abatement costs are known to always be
positive but subject to unknown changes in technology and markets2.
Cost functions for country i = 1, 2 are given by
ci(qi, θi) =
1
2
θiαiq2i , (9)
where αi determines the slope of the marginal cost curves, and is constant. The random
variable θi is log-normally distributed and has a mean value of 1. Marginal costs are derived
by differentiating (9) with respect to qi and are given by
c′i(qi, θi) = θiαiqi. (10)
When Country 1 chooses a tax rate t, it will produce a quantity of abatement q1 that
satisfies c′1 = t. From (10), q1 can be expressed as a function of t and θ1:
q1(t, θ1) =
t
θ1α1
. (11)
Equation (11) implies that if Country 1 sets the tax rate to be sufficiently high relative to
its actual abatement costs (after uncertainty is revealed), all abatement is born by Country 1.
This is because it follows from (11) that
q1 −Q1 ≤ Q2 if and only if t < α1(Q1 +Q2)θ1. (12)
It is possible to obtain C1 and C2 as functions of t by substituting (11) into (2) and (3) 3.
Expected costs for Country 1 and Country 2 can be calculated by taking expectations of the
above equations. In practice, abatement costs are likely to be partially correlated, for example
due to global exogenous shocks or changes in technology that spill over. The random variables
θ1 and θ2 are likely to be more highly correlated if changes in technology that affect abatement
costs spill over between countries and occur on a global level, and if countries have similar
economic features such as the composition of existing capital stock. For simplicity, rather
than explicitly modelling partial correlation, this paper examines both the situation where the
random variables θ1 and θ2 are independent; and the situation where θ1 and θ2 are perfectly
correlated (and therefore equal).
Suppose that the random variables are independent. Suppose that θ is either θ1 or θ2.
Because θ is log-normally distributed, its probability distribution depends on two parameters:
2Prices of many commodities undergo ‘geometric Brownian motion’ where the price at a future point of time is
log-normally distributed and depends on parameters that relate to the drift and volatility of the price (Hull, 2006).
3If q1 −Q1 ≤ Q2, then
C[Q2≥q1−Q1]1 =
1
2
q1(t, θ1)2α1θ1 −
(
q1(t, θ1)−Q1
)(
− q1(t, θ1) +Q1 +Q2
)
α2θ2
and
C[Q2≥q1−Q1]2 = −
1
2
α2q1(t, θ1)
(
q1(t, θ1)− 2Q1
)
θ2.
If q1 −Q1 ≥ Q2, then C[Q2≤q1−Q1]1 = c1(q1(t, θ1), θ1) = t2/2α1θ1 and C
[Q2≤q1−Q1]
2 = 0.
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a ‘location parameter’ µ; and a ‘scale parameter’ σ. The probability density function of θ is
given by
f (θ) =
1
θσ
√
2pi
e−
(lnθ−µ)2
2σ2 .
Let v be the variance of θ. Because E[θ] = 1, it follows from a routine calculation that µ =
−1/2 ln(1+ v), σ = √ln(1+ v), and the probability density function of θ can be written as
fi(θi) =
1
θi
√
2piln(1+ vi)
e−
(ln(θi)−1/2ln(1+vi))2
2ln(1+vi) . (13)
The relationship between the scale parameter σ and the variance v means that it is therefore
a measure of the uncertainty in the marginal abatement cost. Because the expected values
E[θ1] and E[θ2] are equal to 1, it also follows that the expected marginal abatement costs
satisfy E[c′1] = α1q1 and E[c
′
2] = α2q2.
Recall that if X is a function of θ1 and θ2, then its expectation is given by the integral of X
and the probability density function over θ1 and θ2. Thus, expected costs (including trading)
are given by
E[Ci](t) =
∞∫
−∞
Ci(t, θ1, θ2) f1(θ1) f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2. (14)
When the random variables θi are perfectly correlated, so that θ1 = θ2 = θ, then with
probability density function f (θ), expected costs are
E[Ci](t) =
∞∫
−∞
Ci(t, θ) f (θ)dθ. (15)
A consideration regarding whether to use prices or quantities could be the variance in
cost. It is given by
Var(ci) =
∞∫
−∞
(ci(θ)− E(ci))2 f (θ)dθ. (16)
3 Application of the model
In this section, different parameter choices are investigated by numerically integrating equa-
tions (14) to (16) in order to calculate expected costs. These integrals are evaluated using the
software package Mathematica 8.0 (Wolfram Research, 2010). Mathematica is also used to find
the choice of tax rate that minimises expected costs. This section also discusses some of the
economic intuition behind the results.
Section 3.1 examines the case of ex-ante identical countries. Section 3.2 expands the analy-
sis to the case of countries of different relative size. Section 3.3 focuses on optimal ex-post and
ex-ante choices of the tax rate when Country 1 chooses regulation by prices, and examines the
cost-variance for the price-setting country.
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3.1 Ex-ante Identical Countries
Suppose that both countries are ex-ante identical, and so have the same expected marginal
abatement costs, take on the same abatement commitment, and are of the same size. We
compare relative costs under price and quantity linking, so that α1 = α2 = 1 and Q1 = Q2 =
14.
If there were no uncertainty about the costs of abatement, Country 1 could choose a tax per
unit of emissions that results in the required amount of abatement Q1. In this case, regulation
by prices and regulation by quantities would be equivalent and either instrument could be
used to generate abatement Q1 +Q2 at minimum cost.
Figure 1 shows the results from applying the model for ex-ante identical countries for:
firstly, the case of Country 1 chooses regulation by prices when there is no uncertainty; sec-
ondly, Country 1 chooses regulation by prices under correlated and independent abatement
costs, assuming a scale parameter σ = 0.4 (’price-quantity linking’); and thirdly, the case when
both countries choose quantity regulation (’quantity linking’). Table 1 shows expected costs
for Country 1, and expected total costs (for both countries), in terms of the scale parameter σ.
It also shows the optimal tax rate for Country 1, the tax rate that will minimise the expected
cost.
Uncertainty leads to higher expected costs for the price-setting country, and lower expected
costs for the quantity-setting country. As uncertainty in abatement costs (and therefore σ)
rises, expected costs for Country 1 increase under regulation by prices; expected costs for
Country 2 decrease; and expected total costs for both countries increase, but not by as much.
These results are intuitive because when the price-setting country trades allowances with the
quantity-setting country, rents are transferred to the quantity-setting country who receives
the permit price for each tonne of abatement, which will be greater than or equal to the
incremental abatement costs when the quantity-setting country sells abatement, and less than
or equal to abatement costs when the quantity-setting country buys abatement. Total costs
are expected to be higher because of inefficiencies that arise when marginal abatement costs
are not equalised between countries.
More uncertainty also leads to higher costs for Country 1 when θ1 and θ2 are correlated,
compared to when they are independent. The ex-ante optimal tax rate decreases as uncertainty
increases. The optimal ex-ante tax rate is slightly larger when abatement costs are correlated
4When countries are ex-ante identical, total (ex-post) costs for Country 1 are given by
C[Q2≥q1−Q1]1 =
t2
2θ1
+ 2θ2 +
t2θ2
θ21
− 3tθ2
θ1
when 0 ≤ t ≤ 2θ1; and
C[Q2≤q1−Q1]1 =
t2
2θ1
when 2θ1 ≤ t. For Country 2,
C[Q2≥q1−Q1]1 = −
t2θ2
2θ21
+
tθ2
θ1
when 0 ≤ t ≤ 2θ1, and 0 when 2θ1 ≤ t.
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compared to when they are independent, but this tax rate only differs by about 3 percent.
Under quantity-quantity linking, when abatement costs are correlated, expected costs are
unchanged, but when abatement costs are independent, expected costs actually decrease.
For both price-quantity linking and quantity-quantity linking, it is to be expected that there
will be positive welfare impacts from abatement costs being independent, compared to being
correlated, because ‘gains from trade’ arise from differences between the two countries.
The situation that has just been examined involved each country taking on an equivalent
target. In this situation, price-quantity linking leads to an implicit welfare transfer from the
price-setting country to the quantity-setting country because the quantity-setting countries’s
expected costs are lower compared to quantity-quantity linking. However, the following ex-
ample illustrates a situation where a country can benefit from choosing prices.
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Tax
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Expected Cost
Quantity linking,
costs correlated
Quantity linking,
costs independent
Cost if no
uncertainty
Costs correlated
Costs independent
(a)
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Tax
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Expected Cost
Quantity linking,
costs correlated
Quantity linking,
costs independent
Cost if no
uncertainty
Costs correlated
Costs independent
(b)
Figure 1: Expected costs for the ‘price-setting country’, Country 1, (a); and the ‘quantity-setting coun-
try’, Country 2, (b) under price-quantity linking and quantity-quantity linking with the degree of
uncertainty corresponding to scale parameter σ = 0.4 (for both countries); and for comparison, when
there is no uncertainty.
Suppose that Country 2 takes on a much more ambitious target than Country 1, but coun-
tries are similar otherwise (i.e. have the same ex-ante abatement costs), so that α1 = α2 = 1,
Q1 = 1, and Q2 = 10. For the case of uncertain abatement costs and independent error terms
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θi, Country 1 could benefit from choosing prices. Figure 2 shows expected costs for each
country, and demonstrates that Country 1’s expected costs from choosing prices are below
costs under quantity-quantity linking. Thus, there are situations where Country 1 could have
a strategic interest to choose price regulation to minimise its own expected costs while social
costs would be minimised when both countries choose quantity regulations. While in most
situations, the choice of price regulation by Country 1 leads to additional private costs for the
country, the choice of price regulation by Country 1 leads to an increase in social costs in this
special case. Thus, in some cases when abatement targets differ strongly, Country 1 could
have the option to free-ride on Country 2 and domestic policy choice of Country 1 could have
a negative impact on social welfare. This example will be discussed further in Section 3.3.
1 t* 4
t*H1,1L
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Figure 2: Expected costs for both countries (solid lines) when Country 2 takes on an ambitious abate-
ment target (Q1 = 1,Q2 = 10). It is assumed that θ1 and θ2 are independent, and have log-normal
distributions, with each country having a scale parameter σ = 0.2. The horizontal dotted line shows
the expected total cost (for the same probability distribution) for quantity-quantity linking. The op-
timal tax rate in the case that there is no uncertainty (t∗(1, 1) = 4), the price that allowances would
trade at when there is no uncertainty (p˜(1, 1) = 5.5), and the price that allowances would trade at at
the optimal tax rate (p = 7) are also shown.
3.2 Countries of Different Size
This section investigates how the relative size of countries affects the welfare consequences of
price-quantity linking. Suppose that the size of Country 2 is S times the size of Country 1,
and both countries take on corresponding targets so that Q2 = SQ1, then countries have the
same ex-ante marginal abatement costs (after adjusting for size) if α2 = α1/S. It is assumed
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that countries are ex-ante identical except for relative size S, and that parameters for Country
1 are normalised so that α1 = 1 and Q1 = 1, then α2 = 1/S and Q2 = S. It is also assumed that
the tax rate is chosen to be ex-ante optimal so that it minimises expected costs for Country 1.
Tables 2 and 3 show expected costs for Country 1 under both price-quantity linking and
quantity-quantity linking, and the optimal tax rate for Country 1, with Table 2 corresponding
to costs being independent; and Table 3 corresponding to costs being perfectly correlated.
Figure 3 illustrates the cost impacts for different sized countries when abatement costs are
independent. If the country that chooses prices is smaller than the country that chooses
quantities (so that S > 1), expected welfare losses compared to quantity-quantity linking are
lower than in the case of equal-sized countries (S = 1).
If Country 1 sets a tax and is large relative to Country 2, expected additional costs com-
pared to quantity-quantity linking are considerable. This is to be expected, because if Country
2 is small, it will have less capacity to take up additional abatement. For the case when Coun-
try 1 is four times larger than Country 2 (S = 0.25), expected costs are about 1.7 times larger
under price-quantity linking compared to quantity-quantity linking for σ = 0.2 and indepen-
dent θ. As Country 1 becomes smaller, expected additional costs under prices decrease. For
the case of Country 1 being four times smaller than Country 2 (S = 4), expected additional
costs under price-quantity linking decrease to 1.17 times relative to quantity-quantity linking
for σ = 0.2 and independent θ.
3.3 The Choice of Tax Rate
The optimal (ex-ante) tax rate will minimise the expected cost for the price-setting country,
E(C1). Before examining the impact of uncertainty on the expected cost, it will be useful to
calculate the optimal tax rate when there is no uncertainty. It will be shown that the optimal
choice of tax rate is not necessarily the same as the price required for Country 1 to produce
a given quantity of abatement; not necessarily the same as the price that allowances trade for
at the optimal tax rate; and not necessarily the same as the price that allowances would trade
at under quantity-quantity linking. This arises even when there is no uncertainty, and follows
from these values each being the result of different optimisation problems.
Consider C1(θ1, θ2), the ex-post cost for Country 1. When there is no uncertainty, E(C1) =
C1(1, 1). Now if Q2 ≥ q1 +Q1, it follows from (4) that
C1(θ1, θ2) =
t2
2α1θ1
− α2
(
Q1 +Q2 − t
α1θ1
)(
−Q1 + t
α1θ1
)
θ2. (17)
Thus, the optimal ex-post tax rate, t∗(θ1, θ2) is derived by differentiating (17) and solving for
t. It is given by
t∗(θ1, θ2) =
(2Q1 +Q2) α1α2θ1θ2
α1θ1 + 2α2θ2
. (18)
In particular, when there is no uncertainty, the optimal tax rate is
t∗(1, 1) =
(2Q1 +Q2) α1α2
α1 + 2α2
. (19)
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Figure 3: Expected costs for Country 1 under price-quantity linking compared to quantity-quantity
linking for different-sized countries when costs for each country are independent and the degree of
uncertainty corresponds to a scale parameter σ = 0.2.
The optimal choice of tax rate is therefore not necessarily the same as the price required for
Country 1 to produce the quantity Q1 of abatement, which is given by c1(q1, θ1). Furthermore,
the price that allowances trade for at the optimal tax rate could be different to the tax rate.
The ex-post price that allowances would trade at under quantity-quantity linking can be
obtained by solving (6) and is given by
p˜(θ1, θ2) =
(Q1 +Q2) α1α2θ1θ2
α1θ1 + α2θ2
. (20)
In particular, when there is no uncertainty, the price that allowances will be trade will be
p˜(1, 1) =
(Q1 +Q2) α1α2
α1 + α2
, (21)
which is different to t∗(1, 1). The optimal choice of tax rate is therefore not necessarily the
same as the price that allowances would trade at under quantity-quantity linking. Figure 2
illustrates a situation where the optimal choice of tax rate differs from both the price that
allowances would trade at under quantity-quantity linking, and the price that allowances
would trade at under price-quantity linking.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the impact of uncertainty on the optimal ex-ante tax rate. For all
of the examples described in these tables (equally-sized countries, different-sized countries,
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abatement costs independent, and abatement costs correlated) greater levels of uncertainty in
abatement costs (as quantified using the scale parameter σ) lead to lower optimal tax rates.
When abatement costs are independent, equally-sized countries have the greatest reduction
in tax rate; while when abatement costs are perfectly correlated, the greatest reduction in the
optimal tax rate occurs when the quantity-setting country is large.
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Figure 4: The expected cost and variance of cost for Country 1 under price-quantity linking and
quantity-quantity linking, when countries are ex-ante identical (α1 = α2) and abatement costs are
uncertain (with scale parameter given by σ = 0.2). (a) shows results when costs are independent; and
(b) shows results when costs are perfectly correlated (so that θ1 = θ2).
3.4 Variance of Costs under Price-Quantity Linking
A possible motivation for choosing prices rather than quantities, and in particular choosing
a carbon tax, could be to contain costs by fixing the cost per unit of emissions for firms that
are liable under the carbon tax. However, under price-quantity linking, the costs for the
price-setting country are also affected by trade in allowances. This issue was investigated by
numerically integrating equation (16).
Figure 4 shows the expected abatement cost, and the variance in abatement cost, for the
price-setting country when there are equally-sized countries. The variance in cost, under
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Figure 5: The expected cost and variance of cost for Country 2 under price-quantity linking and
quantity-quantity linking, when countries are ex-ante identical (α1 = α2) and abatement costs are
uncertain (with scale parameter given by σ = 0.2). (a) shows results when costs are independent; and
(b) shows results when costs are perfectly correlated (so that θ1 = θ2).
price-quantity linking, is much higher than under quantity-quantity linking. So while setting
a price will contain costs for liable firms, it will increase the uncertainty in the total costs for
the price-setting country, including the cost of allowance purchases.
The tax rate that would minimise the variance of costs for Country 2 is in general above the
tax rate that would minimise expected costs. As the scale parameter σ increases, the deviation
of the tax rate that minimises expected costs and variance increases. For the case of perfectly
correlated costs, the deviation is larger compared to the case of independent costs.
Figure 5 shows the expected abatement cost, and the variance in abatement cost, for the
quantity-setting country when there are equally-sized countries. Under price-quantity linking
the quantity-setting country stands to benefit in terms of expected net costs; but if costs are
highly correlated between countries, the quantity-setting country will experience significantly
greater variance in costs.
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4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analysed the linking of price and quantity regulation under an exogenous quan-
tity constraint by numerically solving a simple two country model with uncertain abatement
costs. In most settings, uncertainty will lead to an expected welfare loss for the price-setting
country and an expected welfare gain for the quantity-setting country. Overall, there will
be an expected total welfare loss for both countries. Large countries in particular are more
likely to have a greater welfare loss from setting a price instead of choosing to use a quantity-
based mechanism. If a large country chooses prices, corner solutions, where the price that
allowances trade at becomes equal to zero, are more likely.
However, as shown by the example in Section 3.3 there are situations where a country will
be better off by choosing a price-based mechanism. In this example, the other country has a
much more stringent target, and the probability distributions that determine actual costs for
each country are independent.
The ex-ante optimal tax rate for the price-setting country will not necessarily be equal to
the expected price that permits will trade at, or the expected marginal cost of abatement to
meet the exogenous target in the quantity setting country. Greater levels of uncertainty will
generally lead to a lower ex-ante optimal tax rate.
While the domestic price per unit of emissions is fixed if a country chooses a tax, total
costs for meeting the exogenous target Qi are still subject to uncertainty. Thus, the choice of
price regulation could decrease cost uncertainty of domestic private entities that would have
to pay a fixed tax rate t per unit of emissions, but will increase the uncertainty of total control
costs of the country. Price regulation would not effectively contain a countries total control
costs, but may be desirable to some emitters within a country, if they pay the cost of their
emissions but do not pay the costs arising from international emissions trading.
In summary, this model allowed the issue of cost-correlation to be investigated in this
context, and the choice of tax rate to be investigated. The results are relevant to domestic
policy choices regarding the regulation of greenhouse gases; and to the design of international
environmental agreements.
The results highlight the importance of international decisions for domestic policies. In the
case discussed here, the design of the environmental standard also defines optimal (i.e. cost
minimising) policy choice for a country. The design of an international agreement ’trickles
down’ and influences optimal policy choice for countries that participate in the agreement. It
therefore may be better for international agreements to be flexible enough to take account of
price-based approaches. However, the question of how to design an international agreement
is a complex one that will need to take into account a much broader range of issues than the
welfare losses that arise from countries choosing a different mechanism to that used by the
agreement.
Policy decisions about whether to use prices or quantities depend on additional issues
to those covered by the model presented here. Our results depend on the assumption that
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the overall quantity target is binding and that there is full compliance. This is equivalent to
there being a very high penalty for either country not meeting their target. This assumption
is not necessarily realistic in practice, since international agreements cannot impose strong
penalties on sovereign countries, i.e. when sovereign countries are unwilling to sign up to
such a treaty in the first place (Nordhaus, 2006). If there is instead a relatively low penalty for
not complying with a quantity based target, price-based mechanisms and hybrid mechanisms
could become more attractive. Montero (2002) has shown that quantity regulation can be
preferable over prices for the case of incomplete enforcement when the costs and benefits
of regulation are taken into account. However, if there is a single social planner, prices, or
hybrid price-quantity approaches, are considered as a social optimal policy for greenhouse
gas control (Nordhaus, 1994; Kolstad, 1996; Hoel & Karp, 2002; Newell & Pizer, 2003; Pezzey
& Jotzo, 2012).
The model also assumes that any positive level of domestic abatement is possible. While
this is not realistic in practice, it is necessary to be consistent with there being a very high
penalty for non-compliance. But it is possible for countries to sequester greenhouse gas emis-
sions, for example by changing land use, so the assumption is not completely unrealistic.
An additional issue not covered by the model is that uncertainty in permit prices can affect
decision making about whether to make irreversible abatement investments (such as capital
investments in renewable energy) or reversible abatement decisions (such as fuel switching).
Zhao (2003) examined this issue using a general equilibrium model and found that incentives
for investment in abatement decrease with increasing cost uncertainty, but that uncertainty
would lead to greater reductions in investment under price-based mechanisms. Krysiak (2008)
examined how instrument choice affects technology choices and found that price-based mech-
anisms lead to suboptimal technology choices compared to quantities. It should also be noted
that both instruments are able to foster innovation in an efficient manner (Downing & White,
1986; Milliman & Prince, 1989; Jung et al. , 1996), with innovation incentives being greater
when when allowances are auctioned rather than freely allocated (Milliman & Prince, 1989;
Jung et al. , 1996; Requate, 2005).
The choice of mechanism also depends on factors such as institutional settings, preferences
of governments and key stakeholders, and political feasibility (Barthold, 1994; Buchanan &
Tullock, 1975; Hepburn, 2006; Howe, 1994). The welfare implications for a single country will
depend on the design of individual policies and costs that are revealed ex-post. Goulder et al.
(1999) has shown that pre-existing taxes can lead to significantly higher abatement costs and
situations where prices and quantities are no more cost efficient, depending on the extent of
pollution abatement.
We expect that many of the conclusions of this paper will generalise to the situation where
there are more than two countries. This is because under the approach taken here, the sit-
uation where there are multiple countries that choose quantities and link with each other is
equivalent to the situation where a single aggregate country chooses quantities.
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Appendix: Tables
Results for Country 1 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Abatement costs are independent
Optimal tax rate 1 0.88 0.81 0.75 0.71
Expected cost when using prices
(at optimal tax rate) 0.5 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.65
Expected cost for quantity-quantity linking 0.5 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.42
Additional expected cost from using prices
(as percentage of cost from using quantities) 0% 15% 29% 41% 51%
Abatement costs are correlated
Optimal tax rate 1 0.91 0.83 0.77 0.72
Expected cost when using prices
(at optimal tax rate) 0.5 0.64 0.74 0.83 0.90
Expected cost for quantity-quantity linking 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Additional expected cost from using prices
(as percentage of cost from using quantities) 0% 27% 49% 66% 81%
Total costs for both countries Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Abatement costs are independent
Expected cost when using prices
(at optimal tax rate) 1 1.005 1.012 1.019 1.025
Expected cost for quantity-quantity linking 1 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.90
Additional expected cost from using prices
(as percentage of cost from using quantities) 0% 5% 8% 11% 14%
Abatement costs are correlated
Expected cost when using prices
(at optimal tax rate) 1 1.09 1.16 1.23 1.28
Expected cost for quantity-quantity linking 1 1 1 1 1
Additional expected cost from using prices
(as percentage of cost from using quantities) 0% 9% 17% 23% 28%
Table 1: Expected abatement costs when countries are ex-ante identical
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a) Optimal tax rate
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 1 0.935 0.872 0.815 0.765
2 1 0.905 0.825 0.761 0.711
1 1 0.883 0.807 0.751 0.708
0.5 1 0.896 0.841 0.799 0.762
0.25 1 0.951 0.922 0.891 0.861
b) Country 1 expected cost
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 0.5 0.479 0.465 0.457 0.452
2 0.5 0.504 0.515 0.526 0.537
1 0.5 0.551 0.592 0.622 0.646
0.5 0.5 0.622 0.695 0.745 0.784
0.25 0.5 0.713 0.824 0.903 0.966
c) Country 1 expected cost with quantity-quantity linking
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 0.5 0.443 0.397 0.360 0.329
2 0.5 0.461 0.431 0.407 0.386
1 0.5 0.477 0.458 0.442 0.427
0.5 0.5 0.489 0.477 0.466 0.456
0.25 0.5 0.495 0.489 0.483 0.476
d) Additional expected cost from using prices for Country 1
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 0 0.0361 0.0679 0.0968 0.123
2 0 0.0432 0.0838 0.120 0.151
1 0 0.0735 0.134 0.181 0.219
0.5 0 0.134 0.218 0.279 0.328
0.25 0 0.218 0.335 0.421 0.489
e) Additional expected cost from using prices for Country 1
(% of cost from using quantities)
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 0% 8% 17% 27% 37%
2 0% 9% 19% 29% 39%
1 0% 15% 29% 41% 51%
0.5 0% 27% 46% 60% 72%
0.25 0% 44% 68% 87% 103%
Table 2: Abatement costs are independent
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a) Optimal tax rate
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 1 0.909 0.833 0.769 0.715
2 1 0.909 0.835 0.774 0.724
1 1 0.913 0.852 0.804 0.762
0.5 1 0.940 0.909 0.879 0.849
0.25 1 1.007 1.009 0.999 0.983
b) Country 1 expected cost
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 0.5 0.568 0.625 0.673 0.714
2 0.5 0.591 0.666 0.729 0.782
1 0.5 0.635 0.743 0.830 0.902
0.5 0.5 0.711 0.863 0.986 1.091
0.25 0.5 0.814 1.028 1.208 1.367
c) Country 1 expected cost with quantity-quantity linking
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
d) Additional expected cost from using prices for Country 1
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 0 0.068 0.125 0.173 0.214
2 0 0.091 0.166 0.229 0.282
1 0 0.135 0.243 0.330 0.403
0.5 0 0.211 0.363 0.486 0.591
0.25 0 0.314 0.528 0.708 0.867
e) Additional expected cost from using prices for Country 1
(% of cost from using quantities)
Size Country 2 Scale factor (σ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4 0% 14% 25% 35% 43%
2 0% 18% 33% 46% 57%
1 0% 27% 49% 66% 81%
0.5 0% 42% 73% 97% 118%
0.25 0% 63% 106% 142% 173%
Table 3: Abatement costs are perfectly correlated
